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Abstract
The paper compares recent antitrust and regulatory decisions in pay-tv  markets in UK, Australia and Italy. 
Notwithstanding different initial conditions in these countries, a common model of regulation has emerged based 
on  the  principle  of  incumbents’  waiving  of  exclusivity  rights  on  content  distributions  for  alternative 
technological platforms and on the creation of a new market for wholesale access to incumbents’ contents by 
downstream competitors.  In UK, these results have been obtained by moral suasion exerted by regulator on the 
dominant satellite operator. In Australia, new market design has been the consequence of undertakings imposed 
by the Competition commission on the proposed content sharing agreements among the main pay-tv operators. 
In  Italy,  the  merger  between  the  two  satellite  operators  in  pay-tv  has  been  authorized  only  subject  to 
undertakings  concerning  removal  of  exclusivity  clauses  for  content  distribution  and  an  obligation  to  give 
wholesale access to premium content by new entrants. The regulatory model developed in EU and Australia 
shows  some  weaknesses  which  would  certainly  require  further  interventions  in  order  to  assure  an  efficient 
market design. First of all, the regulatory creation of a new market at the wholesale level, while increasing 
market competition, it generates also very high transaction costs in terms of definition of internal transfer price 
within incumbent’s division (content broadcasting and distribution) and in terms of accountancy monitoring by 
regulators. Moreover, one question which seems to emerge in Uk, Australia and Italy, is referred to the definition 
of content unbundling and pricing at the wholesale level and on the analysis of their impact on the future of
media convergence.   
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1. Introduction
Media markets are characterized by strong peculiarities (high sunk technological investments, 
economies of scale and scope, network effects, price and content discrimination, incomplete 
contracting,  intellectual  property  governance  and  so  on)  which  often  call  for  long-term 
exclusivity  contracts  between  content  providers  and  distributors  either  for  vertical  or 
horizontal integration. 
The model of Pay-tv business which, in the last decade, has been developed in Europe and in 
Australia is quite different from the US model; while the former shows a high degree of 
vertical integration between content rights’ holders and technological distributors (satellite or 
cable operators), the latter is characterized by vertical separation, content unbundling and 
virtually no-exclusivity provisions for content distribution. The different evolution of pay-tv 
business models in US, Europe and Australia, which might be explained on the basis of the 
diversity of initial conditions in technological equipments, has also generated different paths 
of market competition and alternative systems of regulation. 
The paper compares recent regulatory decisions in pay-tv markets in UK, Australia and Italy,
showing how, notwithstanding different initial conditions in these countries, a common model 
of regulation has emerged, based on the principle of incumbents’ waiving of exclusivity rights 
on content distributions for alternative technological platforms and on the creation of a new 
market for wholesale access to incumbents’ contents by downstream competitors.  
The above policies are somehow path-breaking with respect to traditional attitudes, at least at 
the European Commission level, towards the efficiency of long-term exclusivity for premium 
content distribution through the satellite platform and towards the idea that ‘competition for 
the market’ (auctions on premium contents) was the model to be followed in pay-tv markets.
The  economic  rationale  for  the  new  regulatory  regime  which  seems  emerging  in  UK, 
Australia and Italy will be investigated in the paper in order to point out whether the policy 
measure which have been so far implemented could somehow be extended in several other 
media markets, currently characterized by oligopolistic structures both at the production and 
distribution levels.
An element which is important to stress is that the recent wave of regulatory and antitrust 
decisions  in  UK,  Italy  and  Australia  has  been  the  result  of  different  legal  actions  and 
approaches:  in  UK,  moral  suasion by  OFT  regulator  on  dominant  satellite  operator  has 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art763
induced  BskyB  to  propose  a  strong  and  verifiable  commitments  not  to  undertake 
anticompetitive behaviors against competitors and consumers; in Australia, the Competition 
Commission has requested strong undertakings in order to authorize an agreement among 
competitors concerning content sharing among the main pay-tv operators; in Italy, the merger 
between the two satellite operators in pay-tv has been authorized only subject to undertakings 
concerning removal of exclusivity clauses for content distribution and an obligation to give 
wholesale access to premium content to new entrants.
The  regulatory  model  developed  in  EU  and  Australia,  while  representing  a  Copernican 
revolution for what concerns the removal of multi-platform exclusivity for premium contents 
and  the creation of  a  wholesale  market, shows  however some  weaknesses  which  would 
certainly require further regulatory interventions in order to assure an efficient market design. 
First of all, we argue that the regulatory creation of a new market at the wholesale level, while 
increasing market competition, it might generate also very high transaction costs in terms of 
definition of internal transfer price within incumbent’s division (content broadcasting  and 
distribution) and in terms of accountancy monitoring by regulators, thus calling for the ex-
ante definition of clear pricing rule at the wholesale level.
Moreover, another central question is referred to the definition of content unbundling and at 
the wholesale level. The degree of unbundling and the criteria followed to define wholesale 
prices will indeed influence the business model and the degree of competition at the market 
level: we  point  out  the  anticompetitive  risks  associated  with  the  absence  of  a  clear  and 
verifiable pricing rule and of an obligation to promote unbundled wholesale offers together 
with ban on retail bundling.
The paper finally outlines the need to further regulation aimed at balancing costs and benefits 
between vertical integration and vertical separation in order to grant the development of new 
markets and new technologies in the age of media convergence.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two, we briefly summarize the main features of the 
pay-tv markets in general, with particular reference to the interdependence existing between 
the distribution of contents and the nature of technological equipment. In sections three, four 
and five we briefly recall the main competition issues and policies which have been raised, 
respectively,  in  UK,  Australia  and  Italy.  In  section  six,  we  motivate  the  need  of  further 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press4
regulatory interventions in the above pay-tv market in order to grant an appropriate degree of 
competition, and the full application of the so-called principle of te c hnological neutrality. 
2. The peculiarities of the Pay-tv market: a brief outline of the evolution of European 
markets
Pay-Tv industry structure and dynamics are direct consequences of technological innovation
1. 
Since  its  birth  as  cable  TV,  in  1947,  the  industry  has  followed  a  continuous  path  of 
technological  development  and  change,  sharing  several  common  steps  with  different 
industries such as the telephone industry and, more recently, the Internet.
Competition  Authorities  have  traditionally
2 distinguished  a  separate  market  for  pay-TV
(distinct from the market for free-to-air television, which is financed by advertising and/or 
through State contributions), without further declining the technological features concerning 
the transmission platform employed by operators (terrestrial, satellite, cable or other means of 
transmission). In this market pay tv operators are mainly financed through subscriptions and, 
to a lesser extent, through advertising.
The  structure of  pay  tv  market  differs  substantially  according  to  the  degree  of  vertical 
separation. We can distinguish the following production chain in pay tv :
a) production of contents
b) acquisition and ‘assemblage’ of contents into channels
c) programming of channels into packages to be sold to subscribers
d) transmission via technological platform.
Thus, a simplified Pay TV supply chain involves at least three stages: i) the production of 
programming, that is to say the sale of pay TV broadcast rights to channel suppliers that
aggregate  the  content  to  create  channels  and  then  sale  it  to  pay  TV  operators  or  to 
wholesalers; ii) the retailing of programs to consumers by pay TV operators together with the 
1 See also Nicita and Ramello (2003) “Competition and Exclusivity in Pay-Tv”, forthcoming in International 
Journal of the Economics of Business (n.4, 2005), Routledge, and Armstrong, M (1999). “Competition in the 
Pay-TV Market”, Journal of The Japanese and International Economics 13.
2 See for instance, for the European Commission, the following cases: Case COMP JV 37 BskyB/Kirch Pay TV, 
case IV M. 993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Première, case COMP M.2211 Universal Studio Networks/De Facto 829 
(NTL) Studio Channel Ltd, case COMP JV 57-TPS, Case COMP M. 2845 Sogecable/Canalsatélite Digital/Vía 
Digital, Case COMP M.2876 Newscorp/Telepiu’.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art765
possible wholesaling (or resale) to competitors; iii) the distribution of Pay TV services to 
consumers through infrastructure such as satellite and cable.
While in US we have registered the evolution of a competitive structure for each of the above 
levels of activities within the pay tv market, the European markets (as the Australian one)
tend to be vertically integrated with a monopolistic either, at most, a duopolistic structure. In 
UK, for instance, BskyB is almost the only operator in b) and c), due also to exclusivity 
arrangements  with  content  rights  holders  and  to  its  own  production  of  the  most  diffused 
channels, and it is also the monopolistic operator over the satellite platform. As Nolan (1997)
3
has outlined the above levels of the production chain in pay tv could represent substantial 
bottlenecks for new operators.
The  production  of  contents  can  be  realised  inside  the  pay  TV  firms  in  case  of  vertical 
integration (this happens especially for the ‘basic’ contents) or outside the firm. The latter 
occurs mostly for the premium contents. They are subscription driver contents which have 
been usually represented by key sporting events and blockbuster movies, but which in reality 
include any event which is able to attract a separate demand for pay tv
4. 
The  delivery  process  can  be  operated  by  wireline  or  wireless  network,  in  the  form  of 
terrestrial transmission (analogical or digital), of satellite transmission (point-to-point, point-
to-multipoint,  or  direct broadcast),  of  cable  transmission  (here  the  scenario  is  even  more 
confused  due  the  next  possibility  to  use  digital  telephone  lines  such  as  ISDN,  ADSL  e 
xDSL)
5. According to the initial conditions in a given country, the degree of competition in 
the segment of delivery process will be strictly affected by the actual level of diffusion of 
alternative platforms. In Europe, there are typically some countries, such as UK, Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Germany which registered significant percentage of cable diffusion (prior to 
the satellite introduction), while some other countries (such as Italy, Spain and Greece) had, 
until recently, a virtually non-existent activities in cable.
In addition, as delivery systems are essentially networks, they are characterised by important 
network effects that are generated when the global value of the network increases with the 
3  Nolan,  Dermot  (1997)  Bottlenecks  in  Pay  Television:  Impact  on  Market  Development  in  Europe. 
Telecommunications Policy 21.
4 See European Commission DG Competition COMP M.2876 NewsCorp/Telepiu’.
5 For a technical survey see Parsons P.R. and Freiden R.M. (1998), The Cable and Satellite Television Industries, 
Allyn and Bacon, Boston.
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number of consumers that use it, and when the marginal value of access to the network by 
single users grows with the growth of the number of users hooked up to it. This fact implies 
that who start first in realizing a technological platform enjoys a comparative advantage in 
having  already  built  up  its  network
6:    on  one  hand  it  is  able  to  pay  more  for  obtaining 
exclusive access to rights for premium events
7; on the other hand, it is favoured by high 
switching costs of consumers, generated both by the technological lock-in coming from the 
system already adopted - which at the present occurs mostly when the competing delivery 
systems belong to different domain (for instance, think about cable vs. satellite)
8- and by path 
dependency or loyalty phenomena (such as target rebates on subscription renewal, one stop 
shop behaviour and so on). In contrast to the sectors in which these effects are absent, entry 
costs  for  newcomers in  pay  TV  markets  do  not  depend  solely  on  the  components  that 
characterise the supply side, but also on the dimensions of switch costs to the potential clients 
and users that characterise the demand side; in this case the new entrants have even to sustain 
the entire cost of users’ switching (in addition to the costs of premium events) to contend 
credibly the market (Klemperer, 1987)
9.
The consequence of this mechanism is that when there are strong network effects, potential 
competitors who are more efficient than the incumbent on the supply side, can, in any case, be 
pushed out of the market where increased efficiency cannot compensate for the switch cost of 
customers. This fact can commit the technological change with perverse consequences on 
innovation race. 
At the same time we observe a typical chicken-egg problem which may characterize (and that 
actually has characterized at least in Europe) the pay tv market, given by the circumstance 
that vertically integrated operators might be induced to increase their overall efficiency by 
cross financing their respective investments sustained both in building a delivery platform for 
content distribution and in buying valuable contents for their transmission to final customers
10. 
6 See Economides and White (1994);  Katz and Shapiro (1985).
7 In presence of network externalities, the value of premiums events also for the operator is increasing function 
in the number of its subscribers.
8  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  doesn’t  contradict  what  asserted  about  the  technological  convergence.  The 
differences at the present, just in perspective of such a convergence, can be used to acquire a dominant position 
in the future.
9 Klemperer P. (1987) ‘Markets with Consumers’ Swiching costs’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 375-
394
10 See Parsons and Frieden (1998).
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In  this  respect,  acquiring  contents  without  having  already  reached  a  critical  mass  of 
customers, either investing in building a distribution platform without having the certainty to 
gain ex-post access to valuable content are both very risky strategies and a rational operator 
will not commit him self to sunk and risky investments unless he faces a strong competitive 
structure  in  one  level  of  the  market  (content  production  either  content  distribution  via 
alternative  platforms)  which  may,  in  principle,  alter  providers’  incentives  to  vertically 
integrate, monopolizing the market.
However the above argument implies quite automatically the existence of strong incentives
for first comers to market monopolization and foreclosure by vertically integrating the levels 
of rights acquisition and that of building the transmission platform at the national level (of 
course satellite operators enjoy in this a competitive advantage with respect to cable operators 
which generally may only gain, at most, local monopoly in a given served area). 
1) The  evolution  of  pay  tv  market  structure  in  European  markets  has  thus  been 
characterised by monopolistic or duopolistic satellite operators backward integrated 
upstream in the (exclusive) acquisition of content and channel assembling. 
3. The rise and the  fall of regulatory inter ventions in the UK pay-tv market
The first case of Copernican revolution which we analyze is the OFT ‘induced’ regulation of 
Uk Pay tv market. We define it an ‘induced’ regulation since its actual shape has been in fact 
determined by moral suasion over BskyB’s undertaking in response to a formal investigation 
issued  by OFT  in 1994 and subsequently reviewed in 1996
11.
In 1996 BskyB has officially undertaken a series of commitments regarding: (a)  the obligation 
to  make  a  non-discriminatory  wholesale  offer  to  downstream  competitors;  (b)  the 
commitment  to  avoid  any  discount  either  pricing  mechanism  aimed  at  decreasing  the 
profitability of downstream competitors.
In 2002, the OFT has concluded its investigation
12 on whether BSkyB has acted in breach of 
the Competition Act 1998, following several complaints issued by cable companies NTL and 
Telewest and the (now insolvent) DTT broadcaster ITV Digital. At the moment of the new 
11 A series of informal undertakings in relation to wholesale pricing practices had been given by BSkyB in 
March 1995. See OFT, “The Director General’s Review of BSkyB’s Position in the Wholesale Pay TV Market”, 
December 1996.
12 OFT, Decision CA98/20/2002, 17 December 2002.
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investigation  BskyB  was  the  main  supplier  of  satellite  television  channels  to  the  UK.  Its 
channels were broadcasted via the Astra satellite system and received by UK households by 
means of satellite dishes. NTL was the main cable operator in UK with 2.8 million residential 
cable  television  customers  in  2001,  whereas  Telewest  Communications  was  operating  on 
cable serving over one million of subscribers.
The UK Pay TV structure was composed, at the upstream level, by content rights providers 
and by providers of other program inputs. At this level, BSkyB
13 was the main operator, since 
it had exclusive rights over the most valuable premium contents, such as movies and sport 
programs. Some of the channels created by further ‘assemblage’ of contents included most 
BSkyB’s own made programs. At the “downstream” level, channels were sold to distributors, 
who often bundled channels together into packages, and sold them to final consumers.
fig.1 - Vertical relationships in the UK Market
The pay TV system was mainly supported by DTH
14/Satellite system (operated by BSkyB), 
cable  (operated  principally  by  Telewest  and  NTL)  and  DTT
15  (operated  by  Freeview  and 
ITV). Satellite covers still today about 60% of the market, while cable covers about 30% of 
13 British Sky Broadcasting is a provider of sports, movies, entertainment and news. Its channels are received by 
over  10  million  households  in  the  UK  and  Eire.  In  1998,  it  launched  the  country’s  first  digital  television 
platform, broadcasting over 200 channels.
14 Direct To Home is a technology which delivers television channels directly to consumers via satellite.
15 Digital Terrestrial Television is based on a technology which receives digital television. 














the market. The remaining part is actually occupied by DTT, while only 0.1% is actually 
covered by ADSL. Thus at the moment of the investigation, BSkyB was involved in both 
channel  provision  and  distribution  of  pay  TV  contents.  Such  vertical  integration  and  the 
ownership of pay TV programming rights was the main source of concerns about its conduct. 
In particular, it was alleged that BSkyB was abusing of its dominance position in the supply 
of premium Pay TV contents to distort competition against its competitors in favour of its 
DTH distribution system.  BSkyB had substantial market shares in two sub-markets: i) in the 
retail-distribution  market  it  had  around  66% of  pay-TV  subscribers  in  the  UK; ii) in the 
wholesale market for the supply of premium channels it was (and still is) the only supplier of 
premium sports and movies (although there are other ‘niche’ premium channels) and the only 
wholesale supplier for channels that are key driver of the pay-TV market. In other words, 
companies wishing to compete with Sky in the retail market must have obtain ed  programming 
from Sky's wholesale operation. 
One of the main issues concerning BskyB position was its two-sided nature of being both the 
only wholesaler and the main retailer of premium programmes. In such respect, the OFT 
distinguished two clear separate relevant markets: the retail and the wholesale market.
In such a framework, pay tv companies in UK were competing against BskyB to acquire the 
the rights to broadcast programming and selling them to subscribers. Such programmes were
however different in terms of attractiveness  with respect to those offered by BskyB. In the 
UK, BskyB, as the first entrant in Pay-TV market, acquired soon the broadcasting rights to 
several Hollywood first-run movies and to the main sport events available to Pay TV. The 
possession  of  large  market  shares,  the  existence  of  substantial  barriers  to  entry,  and  the 
ownership of premium programming rights in a vertical integration context, lead the OFT to 
recognize the dominant position of BskyB in the UK pay-TV market. 
OFT investigation’s main purpose was thus to respond to competitors complains such as: (a) 
the allegation that BSkyB was abusing a dominant position by exercising a margin squeeze in 
relation to its premium channels, Sky Sports 1, Sky MovieMax and Sky Premier against rival 
distributors of pay TV; (b) the allegation that BSkyB was abusing a dominant position by 
pricing its channels in the form of anti-competitive ‘mixed bundling’; (c) the allegation that 
BSkyB was abusing a dominant position by giving anti-competitive discounts to distributors.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press10
With respect to alleged margin squeeze, that squeeze exists when the dominant vertically 
integrated company wholesales a product to distributors at a price that allows an insufficient 
margin for them to make a profit even if they are as efficient as the vertically integrated
company’s own downstream distribution business. As a consequence OFT has tested whether 
BSkyB had set its wholesale prices at a level that would prevent a distributor earning a normal 
return  on  the  distribution  of BSkyB’s  premium  channels,  even  if  it  were  as  efficient  in 
distribution as BSkyB. In order to properly assess the test OFT has assumed that BskyB was
formed  by  two  vertically  separate  firms  –  a  broadcasting firm  responsible  for  channel 
production (‘Broadco’) and a distribution firm (‘Disco’) responsible for bundling channels 
and selling those channels to the final consumers. As the OFT recognizes, “the result of the 
analysis was borderline. For some of the period examined (and also for a while before the 
Competition Act came into force) Disco made a loss, albeit a relatively small one. But during 
the period loss turned to profit”, as a consequence OFT concluded not to have sufficient 
elements to clearly assess whether a margin squeeze applied.
With  respect  to  the  anticompetitive  mixed  bundling  (which  is  in  fact  in  our  case  an 
asymmetric mixed bundling given that only the basic package is sold on a stand alone basis), 
the  OFT  has  assessed  that  mixed  bundling  at  the  retail  levels  per  se  not  only  it  is  not 
necessarily  anticompetitive, rather it could have beneficial effects for  customers. The test 
followed  in  this  case  was  aimed  at  verifying  whether,  in  the  case  in  which  the  implicit 
discount generated by mixed bundling was determined by an incremental price lower than 
incremental  costs  for  bundling,  such  discount  would  have  created  a  substantial  market 
foreclosure (which was not the case according to OFT). 
Finally, the OFT also verified complaints related to BskyB eventually abusing its dominant 
position by offering anticompetitive discounts, such as the pay-to-basic ratio (PBR) discount
16, 
the volume discount and the basic penetration discount offered by BSkyB to its distributors.
The anticompetitive impact of those discounts would have been mainly suffered by  competing 
channel  providers,  given  that  distributors  would  have  strong  incentives  to  sell  BSkyB 
16 Oft (2002): “The pay-to-basic discount is based on the sales of premium BSkyB channels relative to the total 
number of basic channel cable subscribers. Volume discounts relate to numbers of basic subscribers to BSkyB 
channels. Basic penetration discounts are based on the sales of basic BSkyB channel packages relative to the 
number of homes which have a TV cable running down the street outside”.
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channels with the purpose to obtain higher discounts. Even in this case, the OFT rejected the 
compliant on the basis of insufficient evidence.
What is the main lesson to be drawn from the UK case?  The most important lesson is related 
to the idea of forcing dominant vertically integrated operators to provide a wholesale offer, 
thus creating a new relevant market for wholesale offer and decreasing the anticompetitive 
effects of exclusivity. The limits of the regulatory approach followed by OFT, which accepted 
undertakings by BskyB rather than forcing it to face a final decision, is that it definitively 
legitimates the existence of a monopoly at the wholesale level, thus inhibiting in fact any 
potential  competition  at  the  upstream  level  by  downstream  competitors,  who  will  act  as 
merely distributors of the vertically integrated dominant firm. With respect to this approach, 
which  however  was  an  ex-post  approach,  the  recent  ex-ante  approaches  followed  by  the 
Australian Competition and Consumers Commission (ACCC) and the European Commission 
have  introduced  several  new  disciplining  rules  against  the  vertically  integrated  dominant 
operator, such as those of recognising the removal of holdback exclusivity and the possibility 
of unbundled wholesale offer to competitors.
4. Beyond smoke-filled rooms: cartelizing pay-tv in Australia
The  Australian  pay-tv  industry  was  launched  in  1995.  At  its  very  beginning  the  sector 
underwent some years of turbulence and in the 1998 Australis, one of the major operators, 
was drop out of the market. However by the 1999 the things turned to a better point and the 
sector reached 1.44 million of subscriber by the start of 2003 with a rate of penetration of the 
22% of Australian household
17. The major retail pay TV operators in Australia are Foxtel, 
Austar and Optus Television but there exist even limited niche and/or regional players
18.
17 It is worth remarking that despite the growth started in 1999 the rate of penetration remains quite low if 
compared to other OECD countries. The  OECD average is approximately 52 per cent, in 1999 and penetration 
rates  in  the  United  States,  United  Kingdom  and  New  Zealand  are  approximately  69,  44  and  43  per  cent 
respectively (source: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission :  Report to senator Alstrom June 
2003). 
18 There are smaller operators:  Television  &  Radio Broadcasting Services  Australia (TARBS), TransACT, 
Neighborhood Cable and Bright. See  Australian Competition and  Consumer  Commission (2003), Report to 
Senator  Alston,  Minister  for  Communications,  Information  Technology  and  the  Arts,  on  Emerging  Market 
Structures in the Communications Sector.
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R ig h ts  s u p p lie rs  a n d  c o n te n t s u p p lie rs
S a le  o f b ro a d c a s t rig h ts  a n d  c re a tio n  o f c o n te n t
e .g . A F L , N R L , m o v ie  s tu d io s
C h a n n e l s u p p lie r s
T h e  a g g re g a tio n  o f p ro g ra m s  in to  c h a n n e ls
e .g . F o x  S p o r ts , X Y Z  E n te r ta in m e n t, D isn e y , P r e m iu m  M o v ie
P a r tn e r s h ip , T h e  M o v ie  N e tw o r k .
W h o le s a le  p a y  T V  o p e r a to rs
T h e  o n -s a le  o f c h a n n e ls  to  re ta il p a y  T V  o p e ra to rs
e .g . F o x te l
R e ta il p a y  T V  o p e ra to rs
T h e  p ro v is io n  o f p a y  T V  s e rv ic e s  to  s u b s c rib e rs
e .g . F o x te l, T e ls tr a , A u s ta r , O p tu s, T A R B S , T r a n s A C T
N e ig h b o r h o o d C a b le , B r ig h t
D is trib u tio n
T h e  d is trib u tio n  o f p a y  T V  s e rv ic e s  to  s u b s c rib e rs
e .g . h y b r id  fib r e  c o a x ia l c a b le , sa te llite , b ro a d b a n d  w ir e le s s
R e c e p tio n
T h e  re c e p tio n  o f p a y  T V  s e rv ic e s  a t th e
s u b s c rib e r e n d
e .g . s e t-to p  u n it a n d  te le v is io n
fig.2 – Vertical relationships in the Australian Market
In  terms  of  subscriber  numbers  Foxtel  is  the  most  successful  operator,  with  800,000 
households receiving its service as at June 2003. Its availability increased substantially in 
March 1999 when it launched services via satellite and satellite customers now account for 
more than 35 per cent of its subscriber base. 
Austar  is  the  second  supplier  of  retail  pay-tv  services  and  reached  406,000  subscriber  in 
March 2003. It is worth noting that Austar operates as a virtual monopoly in regional and 
rural Australia. Indeed Austar generally competes in a different geographical area to Foxtel 
and  Optus.  The  regions  in  which  Austar  and  Foxtel  operate  were  decided  through 
programming  arrangements  entered  into  by  Austar  and  Australis,  which  Foxtel  inherited. 
These agreements divided Australia into ‘Austar’ and ‘non-Austar’ areas and restricted the 
abilities of Austar and Foxtel to provide pay TV services by MDS and satellite in those areas.
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Optus is the operator with smallest number of subscribers: 270,000 at June 2002. Optus is not 
a pure pay-tv services supplier indeed it does not sell pay-TV as a standalone product but 
bundles  it  with  high-speed  Internet  and  local  telephone  services. The  Australian  pay  TV 
industry has been  covering the same path of other countries, the common features  are: a 
highly concentrated retail market, the presence of a vertically integrated major player and the 
problem of premium program resale. The pay TV industry in Australia is converging to a 
highly concentrated and partially vertically integrated model as in other countries. The current 
structure is apparently that of a oligopoly with three major player. Nevertheless as we pointed 
out above the structure is slightly different, since the industrial structure is that of a local 
monopoly of Austar in the rural areas and of a duopoly, with minor competitors, in the rest of 
the country. Furthermore it is worth remarking that Foxtel, the major pay TV operator, is 50% 
owned by the major telecommunication company Telstra creating a kind of vertical integrated 
operator in all the supply chain
19. 
fig.3 – Vertical relationships and cross ownership in the Australian Market (ACCC, 2002)
19  Foxtel  indeed  partly  distributes  its  programs  through  Telstra  delivery  systems  and  Telstra  resale  Foxtel 
programs to 100.000 of its customers.
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Given the high sunk costs of distribution networks the participation of Telstra in Optus can act 
as a barrier to entry for small operators. Thus, establishing a distribution network capable of 
delivering pay TV services involves considerable sunk costs, such as launching a satellite or 
deploying a cable network. 
As these sunk costs are irrevocably committed, the risk of entry is increased. In such a contest 
the  negotiation  of  access  to  existing  distribution  networks  and  the  regulation  of  entry 
constitutes a fundamental point in order to lower barriers to entry. Access regulation can 
provide  for  third  party  access  to  pay  TV  distribution  networks  but  as  the  Australian 
Competition and Consumers Commission (ACCC) recently pointed out
20 the regulation seems 
still too ineffective in Australia
21.
The  third  and  crucial  feature  is  the  presence  of  exclusive  vertical  contracts  on  premium 
programming. As we pointed out the presence of exclusive contracts can lead to a market 
which takes on ‘winner-takes-all ’ type characteristics. Therefore retail pay TV operators have 
an incentive to purchase premium content on an exclusive basis. While the costs of obtaining 
such content may be high, the longer term remuneration for doing so may be higher. 
In  particular,  the  pay  TV  operator  may  strengthen  its  own  position  while  simultaneously 
weakening  the  position  of  its  competitors  that  cannot  obtain  premium  content,  which 
decreases their ability to attract a large number of subscribers. 
The most important recent event faced by the Australian pay TV sector is strictly related to its 
high concentration and to the presence of exclusive contracts. 
On March 2002, Foxtel and Optus approached the ACCC in order to obtain clearance of a 
proposal  relating  to  the  supply  of  Foxtel content  to  Optus  governed  by  a  content  supply 
agreement.  On  June  2002  the  commission  rejected  the  proposal  stating  that  the  proposed 
arrangements between Foxtel and Optus raised if implemented were likely to breach the Trade 
Practice Act.
22 Subsequently to the ACCC response an agreement between Foxtel and Austar 
was also submitted to the Commission for consideration. The agreement provided for the 
20 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission :  Report to senator Alstrom June 2003.
21 The recent long-running legal dispute of the small operator Seven with Foxtel and Telstra over access to 
Telstra’s cable network for Seven’s C7 channels confirm the difficulties of third party access to distribution 
network when the network owner has interest in the supply of services. 
22 Source: ACCC, Foxtel/Optus proposal likely to breach Trade Practices Act, media release, 21 June 2002.
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supply of certain pay TV rights to Austar.  In this context Foxtel, Optus, Telstra
23 and Austar 
submitted to the Commission some undertakings designed in order to address the competition 
concerns that the Commission had identified
24.On November 2002 the ACCC announced that 
it believed the undertakings finally offered addressed the competition concerns that it had 
identified
25.
We do not enter in depth the contents of the agreements nevertheless it is worth remarking 
that they have the characteristic of an horizontal agreement between the major players of the 
market with two main consequences. 
First, the Foxtel/Optus agreement may have the effect of an horizontal integration. The supply 
of contents by Foxtel to Optus may cause a decrease in the variety of programs available for 
consumers.  Indeed  under  the  content  supply  agreement  the  incentive  to  Optus  to  acquire 
programming may be weakened and furthermore under the agreement even if Optus continues 
to  acquire  contents  it  would  faces  restrictions  about  how  the  channels  it  acquires  can  be 
positioned and packaged. This reduction in content-based competition between the parties 
would  likely  lead  to  less  competitive  tension  for  the  acquisition  of  content.  It  would 
considerably enhance Foxtel’s negotiating power in the acquisition of content especially for 
premium  one. This  raised  the  issue  of  whether  new  pay  TV  operators  would  be  able  to 
establish  themselves  as  viable  competitors  given  that  access  to  contents  (especially  to 
premium contents) is a key determinant of competition
26.  
Second, the presence of exclusive vertical contracts, together with a content supply agreement 
have the effect to legitimate the main operator to act as a supplier of the key contents to its 
competitors. Under the content supply agreement Foxtel acts as a content reseller, it buys 
rights  under  exclusive  contracts  and  then  it  sells  it  to  its  downstream  competitor.    The 
problem  of  the  resale  of  contents  (especially  of  premium  programs)  in  the  presence  of 
exclusive  contracts  has  been  analyzed  by  Armstrong  (1999)  and  Harbord  and  Ottaviani 
23 Telstra is the main Australian telecomunication company owing the 50% of Foxtel.
24 This procedure is compliant with the Section 87B of the Trade Practice Act providing that the Commission 
may accept a written undertaking in connection with a matter in relation to which the Commission has a power 
or function under the Act itself. Undertakings are court enforceable.
25 It is worth noting important that the developed undertakings are designed in order to deal with the concerns 
raised by the ACCC as a result of the submitted pay-TV agreements and they are not designed in order to 
address pre-existing competition concerns.
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(2001).  Harbord  and  Ottaviani  (2001)  show,  in  particular,  that  resale  of  premium 
programming for per subscriber fees relaxes downstream competition and provides incentives 
for both downstream firms to increase prices. The profits initially created are captured by the 
reselling firm and then transferred to the rights monopolist. As a consequence the apparently 
beneficial transfer of rights hold under an exclusive contract may have detrimental effects for 
competition and for consumers welfare
27. 
This analysis suggest the necessity of some regulatory control and intervention. In particular 
the resale price of premium programs may be monitored and regulated in order to divide the 
surplus  created  by  premium  programming  between  firms  and  consumers.  Furthermore,  as 
Armstrong (1999), Harbord and Ottaviani (2001) and Nicita and Ramello (2003) point out,
the very crucial issue for competition policy is the presence of exclusive vertical contracts 
such as the most effective remedy for competition would be a ban of such contracts that 
would  transfer  the  surplus  of  premium  programming  from  firms  to  consumer  through  an 
intensification of downstream competition
28.  
Third, as recently pointed out by ACCC
29, the wholesale offers made by incumbent to small 
cable operators should be fully public and transparent so as to avoid any discrimination at the 
downstream level. Moreover, the wholesale offer should enable downstream rivals to compete 
against incumbents by providing an alternative offer. Thus means that downstream operators 
should be given with th right to have access to an unbundled wholesale offer without simply 
accepting the bundling strategies made by incumbents.
The centrality of an unbundled wholesale offer as a policy tool against dominant position has 
been outlined in 2003 by the European Commission, following the authorization of the Italian 
merger between Newscorp and Telepiu’.
27 Harbord, D., Ottaviani, M. (2001), “Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market”, London Business 
School, mimeo, show that in the aggregate consumers may be better off in the absence of contents reselling even 
if some are deprived of premium programming. 
28 The ACCC has recently pointed out the necessity of non exclusivity  measures, e.g. “…a non-exclusivity 
measure is likely to operate closer to the source of the access to content concerns (the barriers to entry created 
by exclusive content agreements) than the access to content measure.” Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission :  Report to senator Alstrom June 2003. pag. 123.
29 ACCC  (2003)  “Emerging  market  structures  in  the  communication  sector”.  A  report  to  Minister  for 
Communications.
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5. The NewsCorp/Telepiu’ merger
In 2003 the European Competition Commission has authorized the merger between the two 
satellite pay tv operators in Italy Stream (NewsCorp) and Telepiu’ (CanalPlus). The merger 
was the conclusion of a five years of battles in the market, in which the acquisition costs of 
premium contents raised enormously (more than 500% in soccer) together with the financial 
losses of the two operators. According to merging parties the rationale for the merger was 
simply  the  idea  that,  given  the  high  costs  of  premium  content  and  the  actual  aggregate 
demand for them, the market would have efficiently allowed only one operator in the market. 
The Commission rapidly rejected the above argument raising serious concerns over a merger 
which would have been created a monopoly in the Italian market for pay tv
30. The battle has 
thus been concentrated on undertarkings. The Commission has finally authorized the merger 
under several conditions concerning, among the others, the removal of holdback exclusivity 
clauses, a mandatory wholesale on unbundled basis and following the retail minus principle.
As  regards  access  to  contents,  the  scope  and  duration  of  exclusivity  rights  held  by the 
combined platform has been extensively reduced to allow such rights to be contested on a 
frequent (in the case of DTH rights) or permanent (in the case of non-DTH rights) basis. 
Furthermore, premium contents to be broadcasted via DTH by the combined platform have 
been made fully available to non-DTH platforms at wholesale prices via the provision of an 
wholesale  offer.  In  addition  Newscorp  will  not  acquire,  through  future  contracts  or 
renegotiations of the terms of the existing contracts, any protection or black-out right with
respect to DTH. The wholesale offer “is intended to allow competitors of the new entity on 
platforms other than DTH to subsist or to enter in the Italian pay-TV market. The underlying 
idea is that such wholesale offer will lower barriers to entry in the pay-TV market by allowing 
non-DTH pay-TV operators to access premium contents which would otherwise be too costly 
for them to purchase directly or which are locked away by means of long-duration exclusivity 
agreements entered into by the incumbent players with the content providers. Some types of 
content (mainly, but not exclusively, football and films) are considered to be subscription-
drivers”. In this respect, the starting point for the calculation of the Wholesale Price pursuant 
to the retail minus principle is the effective retail price charged by the Sky to its customers for 
30 COMP M.2876, NewsCorp/Telepiu’.
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the premium package, minus a quota concerning the avoidable costs and the costs of basic 
package plus a reasonable margin.
fig.4 – Vertical relationships in the Italian Market
The post-merger scenario is thus that depicted in fig.4. The vertically integrated operator, Sky, 
will allow wholesale access to contents for non DTH competitors (such as eBiscom, a new 
cable operator) and will allow DTH competitors to access to its own platform (Sky Techco) at 
non discriminatory price.
Notwithstanding  the  above  undertakings,  after  one  year  the  market  is  far  from  being 
competitive. Competitors have requested formal investigation by the Italian Communication 
Authority in order to verify the potential anticompetitive impact of contractual terms imposed 
by Sky both a the wholesale level and with reference to access to platform. Whereas Sky ha 
rapidly reached 3 millions of subscribers (starting from a basis of 2 million), competitors













newsapers,  the  major  problems  refer  to  the  pricing  criteria  applied  by  Sky  and  to  an 
insufficient degree of unbundling in the wholesale offer.
6. In whose interest? The way ahead for regulatory reforms
In the previous sections we have briefly outlined recent regulatory evolution in UK, Australia 
and Italy. Notwithstanding the different nature of the regulatory and antitrust interventions (an 
alleged abuse of dominant position in UK, an anticompetitive agreement in Australia and an 
anticompetitive merger in Italy), and the heterogeneous structural conditions in the market, 
the  different  competition  and  regulatory  Authorities  raised  analogous  issues  from an
anticompetitive point of view and outlined similar remedies. In terms of the nature and the 
impact of remedies the Italian case appears to be the strongest for three reasons:
1. an  effective  removal  of  exclusivity  clauses  on  premium  contents  at  least  for  their 
transmission on alternative platforms (DTT and cable);
2. an  effective  reduction  in  the  duration  of  exclusivity  on  the  satellite  platform  with 
counterparts  (i.e.  soccer  teams  and  majors)  having  the  right  to  breach  contractual 
terms in advance;
3. an effective obligation, upon the incumbent, to supply an unbundled wholesale offer 
following  the  retail  minus  principle,  determined  according  to  avoidable  costs  and 
international best practice.
In approving the above conditions, the European Competition Commission has completely 
changed its traditional approach toward exclusivity and vertical integration in media markets.
The European Commission in the past years has never questioned the exclusive acquisition 
neither as the main driver of costs increase nor as an anti-competitive market foreclosure 
strategy adopted by incumbent against the new entrant. 
According to the Commission, having access to valuable content was considered a necessary 
condition  to  recover  sunk  investments  in  technological  platform,  while  exclusivity  was 
considered  as  a  way  of  keeping  the  value  of  very  costly  contents.  The  position  of  the 
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Commission could be illustrated with the words of  A.M. Wachtmeister
31, of the EU Media 
Unit:  “the  sale  of  exclusive  rights  to  broadcast  sports  events  is  an  accepted  commercial 
practice. For sports organisers, the sale of exclusive rights is a way of ensuring the maximum 
short-term  profitability  of  the  event  organised,  the  price  paid  for  the  exclusivity  by  one 
broadcaster probably being higher than the sum of the  amounts which  would be paid by 
several  broadcasters  for  non-exclusive  rights.  For  the  broadcaster,  sports  programmes  are 
considered as particularly suited to attracting a large number of viewers. For them, it can be 
said that exclusivity represents: 
a) the only way to guarantee the value of a given sports programme; 
b) the broadcasting company may get more value from the rights if it can sub-license to 
competitors;
c) a way to build up audience, in the short as well as in the long term (consolidation of 
audience base, fostering loyalty, improvement of image);
d) a substantial increase in advertising or sponsorship revenue as sports programmes are 
a means of targeting a specific audience, often in large numbers; 
e) a degree of prestige in being the only broadcaster showing a particularly popular sport; 
f) for pay-TV channels, exclusivity of rights to very popular sports events is fundamental 
in order to attract new subscribers; this is especially true for sports theme channels: 
persuading viewers with specialised tastes to pay for specialised channels is the only 
way  that  many  such  channels  could  be  financed,  since  the  number  of  interested 
viewers would be too small to attract enough advertising revenue; 
g) it may also be vital to re-coup investment in infrastructure; the revenue may be needed 
by a broadcasting company which wants to invest in cable, decoders and/or satellites”.
According  to  the  above  quotation,  content  exclusivity  was  viewed  as  the  only  way  to 
guarantee the value of a given program, to attract subscribers, to recover initial investments 
and so on. As a consequence the only concern related to exclusivity was that of its duration 
which in any case should have to be ‘not excessive’ in length or scope.
The increase in premium content prices induced by ‘competition for the market’ in content 
acquisition has induced a recent wave of vertical and horizontal integration in Europe and in 
31  A.-M. Wachtmeister, (1998) “Broadcasting Of Sports Events And Competition Law”, Competition Policy 
Newsletter 1998 - number 2 - June
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Australia. In Italy and in Spain the two satellite operators decided to merge, in Australia main 
competitors in cable and satellite signed an agreement to share their premium content and 
their  technological  equipments  following  a  rule  of  reciprocity.  While  the  operators  have 
motivated their decision to horizontally merge either to sign a sharing agreement on contents 
on the basis of ‘natural monopoly’ and ‘failing firm defence’ explanations, the Competition 
authorities  who  authorized  under  conditions,  respectively,  the  proposed  mergers  in  Italy 
(NewsCorp/Telepiu’) and in Spain (Sogecable/ViaDigital) and the content sharing agreement 
in Australia, have made a Copernican revolution in their valuation of exclusivity clauses, 
imposing now limits on the duration of exclusivity, the removal of any ‘holdback’ clause and 
an obligation to promote a wholesale offer to competitors as the one actually provided by 
BskyB in UK.
We call the above new attitude a ‘Copernican revolution’ since it reverses the traditional 
approach previously followed in pay tv market, now explicitly admitting: 
(a) that it is the exclusivity request which increases the cost of acquisition, and not vice-
versa,  i.e.  that  the  high  cost  of  rights  obliges  purchasers  of  those  rights  to  ask 
exclusivity  as  a  way  to  defend  the  value  of  those  right;  as  a  consequence,  the 
economic value of rights is recognized not to be exogenous but determined by the 
competition race and the market foreclosure strategies adopted by incumbents;
(b) that it is possible in pay tv market to sustain a new competition model based not on 
‘competition for the market’ strategies, through exclusive access to premium contents, 
rather on ‘facility-based competition’ which enhances the quality of transmission, the 
degree  of  (un)bundling  to  final  customers,  the  possibility  of  providing  customized 
offers and so on.
The  new  approach  followed  by  OFT  in  UK,  European  Commission  and  Australian 
Commission acknowledges that in sectors characterized by network effects, competition can 
only manifest itself through the introduction of new technological paradigms whose increased 
efficiency is so great as to make it convenient to abandon the incumbent. Given the network 
effects, exclusivity clauses only serve thus to reinforce the cost of switching to the customers 
and  users,  thus  increasing  costs  for  new  operators.  On  this  point  some  authors  are  quite 
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explicit
23: “ exclusive contracts (…) can be particularly insidious in the network industries, 
with the danger of, even for new more efficient technologies, the impossibility of reaching the 
critical mass of users necessary to launch a competitive challenge to the market leaders”.
The removal of holdback exclusivity and the obligation for incumbent to provide wholesale 
offers  to  new  entrants,  from  one  side  increase  short  run  entry  by  limited  scale  entrants 
(“splintering”), from the other it induces powerful incentives to invest in new technologies 
(such as DTT and fibre optic networks) and to compete on the quality of the service provided 
rather than on the kind of content sold.
This is a path-breaking result because it applies not only to pay tv but to all media markets 
characterized by a high rate of technological innovation. 
This new approach however could be undermined by a series of regulatory problems such as:
• the economic criterion to be applied to determine an wholesale price;
• the pricing mechanism to be identified in order to provide a non-distorted unbundled 
wholesale offer when the retail price is referred to a bundle;
• the accounting separation to be implemented to verify any ex-post price squeeze by 
the incumbent vertically integrated operator;
• the design of asymmetric regulatory measures to favour new entrants investments in 
new technology.
The first question to be posed in order to solve the above problems is: in whose interest to 
proceed?  The  answer  differs  from  one  case  to  another,  since  while  the  OFT  is  testing  a 
possible abuse of dominant position and not the creation of a dominant position either an 
anticompetitive  agreement.  Moreover,  while  the  OFT  investigation  does  not  question  the 
internal growth of BskyB, the European Commission has questioned whether, through the 
NewsCorp/Telepiu’  merger,  the  new  monopolistic  entity  would  be  able  to  neutralize  any 
potential competition, thus harming in the longer term, consumers welfare.
The European Commission has somehow imposed some asymmetric measures on Sky, which 
recall  indeed  the  asymmetric  regulation  in  telecommunications:  Sky’s  undertakings  are 
23 C.Shapiro (1999) “Exclusivity in Network Industries” George Mason Law Review 7 (3):1-11.On the same 
argument  see  also  D.Baltho  (1999)  “Networks  and  Exclusivity:Antitrust  Analysis  Promote  Network 
Competition” 7  George Mason Law Review. See also Nicita and Ramello (2003).
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supposed not only not to discriminate between its own retail division (Disco) and equally 
efficient downstream competitors but, furthermore, they are supposed to encourage entry even 
by competitors with limited infrastructural capacity in transmission, in order to give them a 
short term access to contents while completing their platform. 
The main purpose followed by the European Commission is that of allowing investors in 
alternative platforms (fiber optic, ADSL, DTT) to be able to complete their investments so as 
to reach a concrete competitive structure at least at the transmission level, while respecting the 
principle of ‘technological neutrality’ often invoked by the European Commission.
In  this  respect,  it  should  be  pointed  out  the  clear  trade-off  which  does  emerge  between 
incumbent’s bundling strategies at the retail level and the obligation of an unbundled offer at 
the wholesale level. Price discrimination via bundling at the retail level is efficient as long as 
a mandatory wholesale offer does affect incumbent’s consumers incentives to buy at the given 
price and bundle. 
In the UK and in the Australian case, regulatory and competition authorities have clearly 
assessed that bundling (between basic and premium channels) at the retail level could be 
beneficial to final customers, as long as it reduces any deadweight loss, as any other price 
discrimination strategy would do. In a sense, the implicit argument in those cases is that the 
wholesale  offer  (both  in  terms  of  prices  and  of  content)  follows  the  retail  offer.  As  a 
consequence, competitors will not be allowed to have such margins to produce their own 
bundled offer different from that established by the incumbent. That means that under the UK 
and the Australian framework, competitors are merely resellers of the incumbent product, and 
do not use that product as an intermediate good in order to build an original and competitive
offer towards final customers.
On the opposite side, the NewsCorp/Telepiu’ decision is rather different. What is important
there is to discipline market power of the new entity through competitors’ ability to enter the 
market and replicate the dominant’s offers. This means that, at least in the Italian case, the 
bundling strategy of the incumbent should follow the wholesale offer and not vice-versa. This 
outcome,  may  of  course  reduce  in  the  short  term  overall  efficiency,  since  it  affects 
incumbent’s ability to adopt its bundling strategy at the retail level as if there was not a 
mandatory  unbundled  wholesale  offer.  Some  customers  thus  may  not  be  captured  by 
incumbent bundling as long as the competitors are not able to provide their own retail offer.
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However, the eventually negative impact of a mandatory unbundled wholesale offer should be 
compared with the positive impact that a reduction in incumbent’s ability to bundle may 
generate by inhibiting incumbent to build an anticompetitive bundling (Nalebuff, 1999)
32, i.e. 
a bundling which reduces entrants’ expected market share, deterring entry.
As Nalebuff observes, there are many cases in which, via bundling, an incumbent operator 
may actually reduces profitability for new entrants. This is a very sophisticated argument 
since while bundling per se is not anticompetitive, some forms of bundling, which increase 
rivals’ costs either increase consumers’ switching costs from the incumbent’s offer, may have 
an anticompetitive impact. It is very difficult, however, to distinguish ex-ante anticompetitive 
from efficient bundling. 
In this context, while a generalized ban on bundling may actually reduce the overall efficiency 
and  consumers  welfare  by  inhibiting  both  anti-competitive  and  efficient  bundling,  a 
mandatory unbundled wholesale offer could reach the desirable result of preserving efficient 
bundling (competitors unbundled access make it possible for new entrants to propose their 
own bundling strategies) while preventing any deterrence effect against competitors through 
inefficient unbundling.
Thus the regulatory choice has to answers preliminary to the question: in whose interests 
applying  a  mandatory  obligation  to  wholesale?  If  the  main  purpose  is  to  give  actual 
consumers with a higher overall welfare, thus incumbents should be free to decide first their 
retail bundling and pricing strategies and than to residually apply a discount to competitors. 
However, when the main aim to be implemented is that of increasing actual competition than 
priorities should be inverted and incumbent’s retail bundling and pricing strategies should be
constrained by an obligation to unbundled wholesale offer.
In  other  terms  the  existence  of  a  mandatory  wholesale  unbundled  offer  produces  several 
effects: it allows immediate access to contents giving investors with resource sufficient to 
reach  a  minimal  critical  mass  necessary  to  complete  their  infrastructural  capacity  in 
alternative platform; it constrains incumbent’s ability to generate anticompetitive bundling.
32 See Nalebuff (1999), Bundling, Yale Icf Papers no. 99-14.
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Of  course,  consumers  may  suffer  in  the  very  short  term,  since  some  of  them  might  be 
excluded   from  access  to  bundled  good,  while  they could  obtain,  in  the  longer  term,  a 
reduction in prices and/or an increase in variety and quality of the retail offer. 
In this respect, what is important is the temporal horizon over which the obligation should be 
adopted.
The following conclusions could somehow be extended to other media markets, every time 
potential competition in these markets could be inhibited by anticompetitive bundling and/or 
by  exclusivity  clauses.  The  creation  of  a  wholesale  market  and  the obligation  to  provide 
competitors with an unbundled wholesale offer will increase potential competition by granting 
immediate  access  to  contents  and  by  constraining  incumbent’s  ability  to  promote 
anticompetitive bundling.
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